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Chapter 1  
Introduction – the puzzle of managed migration  
  
“I think it is a good rule of thumb to ask of a country: are people trying to get into it 
or out of it? It's not a bad guide to what sort of country it is” (Tony Blair 2003)  
  
1 Introduction  
  
There is hardly a day that goes by without immigration featuring in the headlines. The 
issue dominates debate across the political spectrum, and has been a top voting issue 
amongst the British public for over a decade (Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014; Blinder 
and Allen 2016), becoming the most important issue facing Britain for voters in 2014 
(Dennison and Goodwin, 2015, p. 173). It is one of the most divisive and at the same 
time, with public concern over immigration being acute amongst working and middle 
classes and across partisan divides (Fabian Society 2017), paradoxically unifying 
issue of our times.  
 
The referendum in Britain on membership of the EU in June 2016 sent shockwaves 
across the political establishment not just in Britain itself but also throughout Europe 
and the world beyond. This was a campaign and, some would say, a vote fuelled by 
anti-migrant sentiment (Portes 2016). Current Prime Minister Theresa May is so 
convinced that ‘Brexit must mean control of the number of people who come to 
Britain from Europe’ (May 2017), that the government, against damaging economic 
forecasts, plan to take Britain out of the single market for the apparent trade-off of 
reduced immigration. Immigration has undoubtedly shifted from the periphery to the 
centre of the political landscape, and will be a fixture in Britain for years to come. To 
understand how and why immigration has gravitated from low to high politics, we 
have to turn to the New Labour government’s period in office between 1997 and 
2010.  
  
Under New Labour, Britain’s economic (or labor) immigration policy went from a 
highly restrictive approach to one of the most expansive in Europe: work permit 
criteria were relaxed, international students were doubled, the government expanded 
existing and launched new low and high skilled migrant worker schemes, and from 
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2005, a new points-based system (PBS) was initiated.  Overshadowing these 
important reforms was the decision in 2004, to allow citizens of the eight EU 
accession states the right to work in Britain, resulting in one of the largest migration 
flows in Britain’s peacetime history. Couched in the narrative of managed migration, 
these policy reforms signified a new approach to immigration based on economic 
utilitarian arguments (Balch 2010). Coupled with the mantra of attracting the 
“brightest and best” immigrants, managed migration denoted an alternative 
immigration system based on the supply and demand of skills, and above all 
embracing the positive economic benefits of immigration.  With two and a half 
million foreign born workers added to the population since 1997, and over half of 
Britain’s foreign born population arriving between 2001 and 2011 (ONS 2012), 
immigration under Labour ‘quite literally changed the face of Britain’ (Finch and 
Goodhart 2010, 3). This period was, and is, the Making of a Migration State.   
  
New Labour’s managed migration policy stood in stark contrast to Britain’s restrictive 
immigration past. Writing in 1994, Gary P. Freeman famously described Britain as a 
‘deviant case’ in Western European migration policy. For over three decades, 
successive British governments had managed to combine a liberal approach to flows 
of capital and trade with effective limits on the flow of immigrants. Historically for 
Britain, and comparatively across Europe, Labour’s reforms were an ‘unprecedented 
policy reversal’ (Hansen 2014). 
  
By the time Labour left office in 2010 then, a ‘reluctant country of immigration’ 
(Layton-Henry 1994) had been transformed into a fully-fledged ‘migration state’ 
(Hollifield 2004). This was the defining breakpoint between Britain’s post-war 
bipartisan consensus of ‘zero immigration’ (Freeman, 1994), and today’s political 
fixture, where far from being a taboo subject for politicians, immigration could not 
figure more prominently in political debate. This was an unprecedented period of 
immigration policymaking, which both broke with the past and set the stage for where 
Britain is now.   
  
The Labour government’s rapid policy change is puzzling for at least two reasons. 
Firstly, the existing political science literature has often emphasised the ‘path 
dependent’ character of immigration policy in Britain and indeed elsewhere (Hansen 
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2000; Tichenor 2002), suggesting that immigration policy change is likely to be 
incremental at most. Immigration policy is often shaped by legacies of the past 
because policies can change populations and set the policy norms for successive 
administrations (Ellerman 2015; Wright 2012). Secondly in no Western country can a 
party gain votes by promoting or expanding immigration (Lahav 1997). The Labour 
government’s liberalisation of immigration policy went against public opinion, and 
therefore there was no obvious electoral dividend to their expansive regime. Whilst 
the British public has long been in favour of reducing immigration, the high level of 
public concern began in 2000, at a time where the New Labour government were 
pursuing the most expansive immigration regime to date (Ipsos Mori 2015; Evans and 
Chzhen 2013).  Indeed Labour’s policies were certainly not a vote winner; they have 
since dogged Labour’s time in opposition, and public concern about large-scale 
immigration contributed to their electoral defeat in 2010 (Carey and Geddes 2010; 
Bale 2014), and hindered their chances of winning office in 2015 (Beckett 2016, p.7; 
Cruddas 2016; Geddes and Tonge 2015).   
  
How then to explain a change that was both electorally risky, and ran counter to 
Britain's past immigration policy? How did a country that was defined by its 
‘aspiration for zero immigration’ (Freeman 1994) evolve into a fully-fledged 
‘migration state’? The Making of a Migration State explains why such a policy 
transformation transpired under the Labour governments, by unpacking the 
mechanisms and processes that led to such an unexpected outcome. Ultimately, this 
book is about why governments liberalise economic immigration policy, and the 
unintended consequences of intended actions. This book will be of interest for 
anybody who wants to understand why immigration is dominating the political 
debate, and will be essential reading for those wanting to know why governments 




1.2 Unpacking the Migration State  
The objective of this book is to explain the expansionary developments of economic 
immigration policy under the Labour administrations of 1997 – 2010. It is important 
to stress from the outset that the focus of this research is explicitly with labour and 
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student immigration, which combined I refer to hereon in as economic immigration. 
These two categories are closely related because these streams are ‘wanted’ 
immigration in contrast to ‘unwanted’ immigration such as irregular, humanitarian or 
family migration (Joppke 1998). I use the terms expansive and/or liberal policy to 
signify the Labour government’s approach to facilitate entry of migrant workers, 
rather than any liberalisation in terms of migrant rights. Although workers rights in 
terms of transitions and qualifying settlement periods were also loosened under 
Labour in conjunction with the wider managed migration regime. While other areas of 
immigration policy, such as asylum and irregular immigration, became increasingly 
restrictive during this period, the Labour government’s economic immigration policy, 
which this book is concerned with, was undoubtedly an expansive one. 
 
In the context of economic globalisation and an embedded international human rights 
discourse, some contend that there has been a decline in power, significance and 
sovereignty of the nation state. In turn, it is argued that nation states have ‘lost 
control’ of their borders and are thus no longer the crucial actors in immigration 
policymaking (Soysal 1994; Sassen 1996; Jacobson 1996). This may hold true for 
some migration streams, such as humanitarian immigration or family reunification 
where international conventions can override domestic autonomy, but given that the 
nation state primarily determines the management and regulation of economic 
immigration policy, at least in Britain, this book employs approaches that focus on the 
domestic political arena.   
 
The literature on immigration was once dominated by accounts from economists and 
sociologists that suggest (if only tacitly) that the nation-state and the institutions 
which comprise it were of secondary importance relative to international market 
forces and the personal networks which drive individuals to migrate (Castles 2004; 
Wright 2010). Yet what ‘governments do matters a great deal’ (Castles  and Miller 
2003, p. 94) in terms of explaining migratory movements. While immigration flows 
are not entirely determined by states, the decision ‘to accept or reject aliens has not 
been relegated to actors other than the state, and the infrastructural capacity of 
modern states has not decreased, but increased over time’ (Joppke 1998, 267). 
Independently of other conditions, ‘it is state actions with respect to borders that 
determine whether any international migration will take place’ (Zolberg 1989, 205). 
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In other words, without nation-states and their associated apparatuses that define their 
borders, ‘there would be no such thing as international migration’ (Balch 2010, 4). 
The state still retains an active role in defining a liberal or restrictive immigration 
regime, and it is the state which ultimately decides who enters and resides legally, 
naturalizes and who can become part of the nation (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000, 167).  
 
This is not to say that policy is the only driver of immigration or that policies always 
achieve their intended outcomes (Cornelieus et al. 1994). For example, the sharp 
increase in net migration in Labour’s first year office (1997-1998) was largely beyond 
the government’s control and attributable to other factors.  Net migration rose from 
48,000 in 1997 to 140,000 in 1998 in large part due to: a rise in asylum applications 
following the Kosovo War (Home Office 1999); emigration decreasing from 45,000 
to 11,000 (ONS 2006 p. 13); and EU immigration from the 15 Member States rising 
from 18,000 in 1997 to 33,000 in 1998 (ONS 2014). Thus net migration rose due to 
both an increase in inflow of 63,000 and a 28,000 reduction in emigration, neither of 
which in this case was due to any policy action by the Labour government.  However, 
whilst the economic and social push and pull factors which drive immigration 
explains some of the increase in net migration under Labour, it is fair to say that the 
unprecedented increase overall was largely due to the government’s policy reforms, 
and in particular the A8 decision in 2004.  
 
Policy levers do not always drive immigration flows then, and this is true across 
liberal states. Immigration policies in labour-importing countries have been said to be 
converging (Cornelieus et al. 2006), partly because of the shared challenges, they face 
because of the liberal paradox. The liberal paradox first coined by James Hollifield 
(2004) refers to the contradictory pressures that the nation state face on immigration, 
between market forces pushing states towards greater openness, and powerful 
domestic pressures pushing towards closure. Alternatively, as James Hampshire puts 
it (2013, p. 12) the contradictory pulls between the logic of openness (because the 
liberal state is conditioned by constitutionalism and capitalism) and the logic of 
closure (because representative politics and nationhood are also facets of the liberal 
state). This leads Hollifield (2004) to conclude that ‘trade and migration are 
inextricably linked… Hence, the rise of the trading state necessarily entails the rise of 
the migration state where considerations of power and interest are driven as much by 
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migration as they are by commerce and finance (p. 193). Whilst economic and social 
forces are the necessary pre-conditions for migration to occur, the ‘sufficient 
conditions are legal and political’ (Hollifield et al. 2008, p.341) because ‘states must 
be willing to accept immigration and to grant rights to outsiders’ (Hollifield 2004, 
885) in the first instance, thus policies themselves clearly have a significant role in 
shaping patterns and flows of immigration (Meyers 2000). It makes sense then that 
we would seek to understand the factors that drive states to formulate their 
immigration policies in the way they do.  
  
If Britain was previously ‘a country of zero immigration (Freeman 1994), it is hard to 
deny that the Labour administrations transformed Britain into a migration state in 
terms numbers alone, even more so because, as we shall see, their reforms were 
driven by a capitalist imperative to some extent. The 2011 Census showed that the 
population of England and Wales was 56.1 million, a growth of 3.7 million or 7.1 per 
cent increase in the 10 years since the last census in 2001; a period almost entirely 
governed by Labour. Fifty six per cent of the population increase in England and 
Wales was due to migration. In the UK as a whole, the foreign-born population nearly 
doubled between 1993 and 2011 from 3.8 million to over 7 million, with almost 40 
per cent of foreign-born population arriving in 2004. This was the largest growth in 
the population in England and Wales in any 10-year period since the census began in 
1801 (Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014).  
 
This book is about explaining how and why a government expands labour 
immigration policy, and the consequences of doing so in terms of the politics such a 
policy can produce. I therefore want to expand the concept of the Migration State to 
also refer to the politicization of migration as a further component. What I mean by 
this is the way in which immigration has come to dominate the political debate, 
shaping voting intentions, and becoming a contested policy arena across partisan 
divides. This is harder to quantify but nonetheless that immigration has gravitated 
from a marginal issue of concern to one of the top three voting issues in itself 
demonstrates how politicized immigration has become (Ipsos Mori, 2015; Duffy, 
2014). Few would deny that immigration has become highly salient amongst the 




The degree of saliency and polarization condition whether an issue is politicized or 
not. Drawing from van der Brug et al. (2015, p.6) it is the combination of agenda-
orientated and conflict-orientated approaches that configure whether an issue is 
politicized. The agenda-setting literature (Jones and Baumgartner 2004; Kingdon 
1995) tells us that it is only when a social topic is defined as a problem that we can 
really speak of a political issue. Agenda-setting theory focuses on the different 
thresholds that prevent a topic from becoming a political issue. It serves to reinforce 
that as long as ‘the topic is treated as one that does not require state action, it is not 
politicized; it is not even a political issue’ (van der Brug et al. 2015, p.). Although 
public concern over immigration was acute in early 1970s Britain (Saggar 2003), and 
so-called bogus asylum seekers received a vast amount of press attention in the late 
1990s (Kaye 2001), these waves of public discontent are marginal in contrast to how 
salient, or at least the importance, the public attribute to the issue now. As we shall 
see in chapter three, in the post-war period a bipartisan consensus of limited 
immigration dominated the political spectrum, which served to defuse the issue 
altogether so that immigration was not on the political agenda. In the 2010s 
increasingly elites frame immigration as a problem that requires state action. 
Immigration in 2010s Britain certainly fulfills the criteria of heightened saliency, 
intensified attention and resoundingly framed as a problem needing state action.   
 
An issue only qualifies as politicized if there is also a high degree of conflict, be this 
conflict over the policy direction or conflict upon the means, and instruments to 
resolve the problem. The polarization element of politicization draws from the party 
politics or electoral competition school of thought (Downs 1957), scholars of which 
highlight the importance of positional competition and the extent to which different 
parties have polarizing positions on the issue. When political actors have different 
positions on an issue they are in conflict, and thus the issue is polarized. Opposing 
positions may have always existed, but if the issue is not on the political agenda, the 
conflict is dormant (van der Brug et al. 2015, p. 5).   
 
Conflict can divide both across and within parties. Thus where an issue produces 
intense intra-party conflict, parties and governments will try to de-emphasize issues 
on which they internally disagree. But of course parties and governments do not 
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exercise full control over the political agenda. Newer parties, such as green parties 
politicizing environment issues or more aptly here radical right parties politicizing 
immigration, often politicize new issues. Immigration in Britain clearly meets the 
criteria of a high conflict and thus polarizing issue, both across parties and perhaps 
more interestingly within parties.  We delve into more detail on the politicization of 
immigration in the epilogue chapter. Suffice to say for now that immigration in 2010s 
Britain is both highly salient, and highly polarizing and thus a politicized issue. These 
three components then – immigration being tied to trade, actual unprecedented 
increase in net migration and immigration being highly salient, highly polarizing and 
thus politicized – comprise Britain as a migration state.  
 
Britain is of course not alone in becoming a migration state; as mentioned, liberal 
states are arguably converging on immigration policy. Wide ranges of explanations 
have been advanced to explain such convergence but these often overlook the policy 
process itself. Analysis of immigration in political science has been particularly 
attentive to the challenges immigration poses to the nation state (Joppke 1998; 
Hampshire 2013), but very few scholars have attempted to unpack the ‘black box’ of 
immigration policymaking. This has meant that the existing literature tends to focus 
on how just one aspect shapes policy outcomes. Whilst political economists look to 
the role of trade, production, economic context and demands from employers 
(Caviedes 2010; Freeman 2006; Cerna 2009; Menz 2008), institutionalists have 
demonstrated how liberal norms and international courts facilitate humanitarian and 
family migration (Guiraudon 2000; Joppke 1998). Meanwhile party politics scholars 
have shown us how mainstream and particularly extreme parties mobilize the issue 
(Bale et al. 2010; Mudde 2007: Norris 2005), in contrast to public opinions 
researchers who demonstrate the drivers of public anti-migration sentiments (Citrin et 
al. 1997; Ivarsflaten 2005; McLaren and Johnson 2007). Finally, scholars of national 
identity have shown how nation building, national cultures and policy legacies 
(Wright 2012; Ellerman 2015) can shape policy. 
 
 
1.3 Multiple lenses  
Immigration policymaking has long been an explanatory challenge for political 
scientists because a myriad of factors and considerations shape policy outputs. As 
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Jupp (1993, 254) notes, there is ‘no single “scientific” analysis that is likely to 
provide a complete model for the politics of immigration policy’, because any 
comprehensive analysis of immigration policymaking needs to consider a variety of 
determinants. Precisely because a number of factors shape immigration policy, to 
understand the policymaking process it makes sense to adopt a multiple lenses 
framework that can explain the different determinants of government action and elite 
preferences. 
 
At any one time, governments must grapple with public demands and electoral 
competition, the needs of the labour market and the consequential demands from 
employers, conflicting policy visions from different departments, as well as 
geopolitical pressures and international conventions that restrict the autonomy of the 
state. Three approaches – organised interests, party politics and historical 
institutionalism – were used to understand the divergent objectives, drivers and 
considerations that influence the construction of immigration policy. By employing 
different lenses to the question of policy change, the book offers an account that 
recognises the multifaceted considerations of policymakers, as well as the complexity 
of the policymaking process.   
  
The first approach – organised interests – looks to the role of non-governmental actors 
to explain policy change. The organised interests approach posits that immigration 
policy is a product of bargaining and compromise between government and interest 
groups. This position contends that governments have expanded economic 
immigration because organised interests try to force governments to adopt specific 
policies (Freeman 1995; Menz 2008; Caviedes 2010). Central to this is the 
recognition that contemporary liberal states are capitalist states and are thus 
responsive to the demands of business (Hollifield 2004; Hampshire 2013).   
  
Gary Freeman commented over thirty years ago that migrant labour was, ‘not merely 
a temporary convenience or necessity, but a structural requirement of advanced 
capitalism’ (Freeman 1979, 3), and this remains the case. In lower-wage sectors 
migrants fill labour market shortages, in particular the so-called 3D jobs (dirty, 
dangerous or degrading) which indigenous populations are reluctant to do. At the 
other end of the scale, high-skilled immigrants have become imperative to fill skill 
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shortages. The need for a mobile and flexible labour pool has intensified and in a 
globalised economy, where large transnational firms operate without borders, greater 
flows of intra-corporate transfers are inevitable. The dependence on immigration has 
also extended to the higher education sector, where non-EU students and their 
considerable tuition fee contributions are now integral to financing the system as a 
whole. In essence, ‘advanced capitalist states cannot afford – literally as well as 
metaphorically – not to solicit immigrants’ (Hampshire 2013, 12).   
  
The organised interest approach argues then that interest groups, especially employers 
in the case of economic immigration, will attempt to convince governments of the 
need for foreign labour and thus lobby governments for more expansive immigration 
policies. Accordingly, because these groups have more resources and are better 
organised than anti-migrant groups, governments respond to such mobilised demands 
as it is in their electoral interest to do so. Immigration policies are thus said to mirror 
the interests of those who can mobilise most effectively and/or have the most 
resources, and these tend to be those who stand to gain from expansive policies.  
  
While those who adhere to the organised interests approach place primacy on the role 
of non-state actors, other authors contend that it is political parties that shape policy 
(Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove 2006; Bale 2008; Givens & Luedkte 2005). Stemming 
from a broadly elitist perspective, proponents of the ‘”politics matter” school of 
thought’ (Imbeau et al. 2001, 1) argue that it is the political parties and the actors that 
comprise them which shape the political debate and ultimately determine policy. 
Political parties influence public policy both by translating public opinion into 
policies in exchange for support, and at times acting as agents of change on the basis 
of ideologies (Schmidt 1996, 155). This perspective argues then that immigration 
policy is a product of partisan differences and/or party strategy.   
   
Whilst parties are office-seeking organisations they are also fundamentally configured 
by a set of defining ideas (in other words a party ideology), which provides a coherent 
package of principles and beliefs. This ideology, in principle, reflects both the party’s 
tenets and their core constituents concerns and thus acts as blueprint to guide party 
action. Immigration is an ideologically divisive issue for established parties of the left 
and right as it ‘cuts across normal lines of political battle’, precisely because it relates 
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to wider social issues such as ‘law and order, integration, employment and national 
identity’ (Lahav 1997, 382; Freeman 1979; Triadafilopoulos & Zaslove 2006, 32). 
Nonetheless, party ideology and the broad left/right spectrum persist in shaping elite 
preferences to immigration to some degree (Ireland 2004; Lahav 1997), and 
fundamentally while office-seeking may be the primary motivation for parties to 
change policy, the essence of party success entails an ‘achievement of a satisfactory 
trade-off between ideological introversion and electoral extroversion, between 
principles and power’ (Bale 1999, 7).  
  
Essentially parties matter in explaining policy change because unlike organised 
interests ‘parties actually control the government’ (Burstein and Linton 2002, 385). If 
party ideology conditions political elite preferences, since it is these actors which 
ultimately direct and enact policy, we would expect this to be reflected in policy. 
Accordingly, it is political parties and the elites which constitute them, which 
condition the direction of immigration policy by way of channelling their ideology 
through policies, reflecting electoral preferences, competing with opposition parties to 
win voters and in turn structuring the political debate on immigration.   
  
In contrast to those who focus on party political interactions, a third perspective looks 
to the state itself and the institutions which comprise it to explain government 
decisions on immigration policy. New institutionalism “brings the state back in” by 
focusing on how administrations and bureaucracies shape immigration policy. The 
new institutionalist school claims that political institutions can be autonomous, and it 
is therefore these apolitical (in partisan political terms) institutions that form 
immigration policy according to the interests of the state. These emphasise the way in 
which actions of individuals exist within the context of the rules and norms of 
institutions (March and Olsen 2006). According to Boswell (2007, 79) there are two 
features of a definition of the state necessary for a neo-institutionalist analysis. The 
first is that the state cannot be understood as a monolithic entity; there must be some 
disaggregation between a system of party politics and the administration or the state’s 
bureaucratic apparatus that determine the implementation of policy. Secondly, there 
must be conceptual space that allows for the possibility of the state having 
‘preferences which are not reducible to some matrix of societal interests’ (Boswell 
2007, 79). The autonomy of preferences could stem from the interest of the 
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administration in securing legitimacy and/or the organisational dynamics and interests 
of different state departments.   
  
One variant of new institutionalism, historical institutionalism, is particularly 
pertinent for explaining state decisions with regards to immigration policy, because 
immigration policy is so often a product of policy legacies (Wright 2012) and made 
and framed on the basis of long-held, embedded ideas about the objectives and ideal 
approach to the regulation of immigration (Hay 2006; Béland 2005; Hansen 2000). 
This approach argues that immigration policy is often a product of past political 
decisions – both in terms of the ideas structuring policy and more technical elements 
such as legislation – which constrains future action and thus create a path-dependent 
effect on policy (Hansen 2000).   
  
Drawing from a ‘cultural’ understanding of human agency (Hall and Taylor 1996; 
Hay and Wincott 1998), historical institutionalism postulates that the agencies, 
bureaucracies and departments, which make immigration policy, are built on 
ideational foundations – that is the initial construction of institutions are built on 
ideas. Subsequently these institutions develop ideas and framings on the policy areas 
within their remit in an autonomous manner, ‘screened from political pressure’ 
(Boswell 2007, 83). Through processes of normalization and socialisation, certain 
ideas and framings become embedded in these institutions, which serve as cognitive 
filters through which actors come to interpret their environment. Crucially, the 
historical institutionalist is concerned with how, under certain conditions, such 
institutionalised ideas and paradigms, such as an established policy frame of 
immigration, are contested, challenged, and replaced (Hay 2006, 65; Berman 1998). 
For the historical institutionalist, it is the state and the institutions that comprise it, 
which shape immigration policy.   
  
In some ways these approaches offer ‘self-contained “worlds” from which to view the 
policy process’ (John 1998, 16), although they can work to complement each other. 
Organised interests focus on the associational relationships between non-state actors 
and government. The politics matter school of thought places primacy on the party 
composition of government, and the preferences and interests of party actors. 
Historical institutionalists examine the norms and habits of policymaking in different 
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policy sub-systems. Although these approaches are in ‘dialogue with each other’, they 
are also ‘self-referential paradigms based on assumptions about the possibilities of 
human agency, the effect of structures, the meaning of power and the nature of the 
state’ (John 1998, 17). Fundamentally each approach assumes that a different set of 
actors dominate and control the policy agenda – non-governmental actors, political 
parties and institutional actors respectively – and each stresses different causal 
mechanisms at play in policy change. The book applies each approach to the case of 
immigration policy under the Labour governments, and examines the explanatory 
power they hold.  
  
1.4 Plan of the book  
The book is organised as follows. Chapter two considers the three theoretical 
approaches adopted in more detail and addresses some key issues of defining policy 
change. The chapter explores the core explanatory argument of each approach, and 
reviews the evidence in terms of how each factor has been demonstrated to shape 
immigration policy, and gives details on the adopted methodology and research 
design.  The chapter delves into how different sets of actors, including non-
governmental actors, political parties and civil servants, are said to influence policy, 
and establishes the conceptual and analytical tools to examine how interests, ideas and 
institutions can prompt policy change. 
 
In chapter three we move to Britain’s history of immigration policy from the post-war 
period until Labour left office in 2010. Britain has long been a ‘reluctant country of 
immigration’ (Layton-Henry 1994) and given that the majority of Britain’s post-war 
restrictive measures were targeted at non-white immigrants; many scholars contend 
that Britain’s immigration regime was underpinned by racialisation. This chapter 
traces Britain’s immigration evolution from a ‘country of zero immigration’ (Freeman 
1994) to a migration state, to illustrate the unprecedented shift under the Labour 
governments in comparison to Britain’s post-war restrictive framing.  
 
Chapter four turns to the role of non-state actors in Labour’s immigration policy. 
Taking an organised interests lens the chapter examines whether policy change was a 
result of interest groups lobbying the government for expansive policies. The chapter 
explores the ways in which non-state actors, such as employers and employer 
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associations, unions, sectoral interest groups, and think tanks, did or did not influence 
immigration policy in the period 1997 to 2010.  
  
The focus of chapter five is on the governing party and the elites that comprised it. 
Here we consider the party political context and explore whether party ideology, 
intra-party change and party competition shaped immigration policy in this period.  
The chapter focuses on how the ideas of the governing party changed, and the impact 
this had on the immigration policy preferences of the political elite. Relatively few 
scholars have examined how party ideology shapes immigration policy (see Odmalm 
2014; Hinnfors et al. 2012 for exceptions), and this research seeks to fill this gap by 
analysing how Labour’s ideology changed the preferences of the leading political 
elite.  
 
Chapter six adopts a ‘culture’ understanding of historical institutionalism, and 
considers the role of government departments, and the policymaking process itself. 
The chapter does this by examining the administrative context of immigration 
policymaking, analysing the processes of policymaking, such as which departments 
were involved, how immigration was framed, and how entrenched institutional 
cultures did or did not influence immigration policy. The chapter also considers 
whether changes to the machinery of government – including an initiative for joined-
up government and evidence-based policy – had an impact on immigration 
policymaking. This chapter delves into the ‘black box’ of policymaking, and gives 
insights into the conflicting objectives that inform government decisions on economic 
immigration policy.   
  
Chapter seven brings the key arguments of the book together by summarising the 
findings from the three empirical chapters, and reflecting on the utility of the different 
theoretical approaches employed for explaining policy change. The chapter calls for 
complex causality and provides an overarching explanation for this case of policy 
change, outlining the necessary conditions, ideas, and context which gave way to a 
shift in the policy framing of immigration.  
 
The final epilogue chapter reflects on New Labour’s legacies on the politics of 
immigration and beyond. The chapter looks at feedback effects of Labour’s reforms 
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on policymaking, and the repercussions of Labour’s policies on the broader political 
landscape to unravel how immigration has become so dominant in debate.  New 
Labour’s policies brought immigration to the fore of the political landscape, and in 
this sense, it is no exaggeration to say that the period under Labour has transformed 
the politics of immigration in Britain.  
 
